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The Act aims to keep children out of detention and away from the formal criminal justice system, mainly through diversion. 15 When these interventions would be inadequate or unsuccessful, the Act provides for child offenders to be tried and sentenced in child justice courts. Until now there has been little discussion of the details of the provisions dealing with sentencing.
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Sentencing in a child justice court is regulated by chapter 10 of the Act and section 68 is the first section in this chapter. It reads as follows:
A child justice court must, after convicting a child, impose a sentence in accordance with this Chapter.
This section effectively amounts to the "jurisdictional" provision of the new child sentencing system. It not only mandates child justice courts to impose their sentences in terms of the Act, but also provides the first set of boundaries (or the first part of the framework) within which sentencing should take place.
Despite its brevity section 68 is not without interpretative challenges. Of course, it has to be interpreted within the context of the whole Act. 17 Explaining this context is the first function of this article. The various aspects of section 68 are then evaluated.
The greatest challenges lie in the meanings of the words "child justice court" and "child", as well as the precise extent of the punitive jurisdiction of the courts. 
Introduction
The Act itself contains a number of useful interpretive tools. The Preamble is particularly important. The current trend 18 amongst our courts (and the Constitutional Court in particular) is to use preambles to legislation quite extensively in the process of interpreting that legislation. 19 A preamble is considered a valuable summary of what the legislation aims to achieve, 20 and the lengthy Preamble to the Act is a good example of this approach. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act are also useful tools: section 2 reflects the objects of the Act and section 3 contains guiding principles to be applied in relation to the Act. These sections reinforce some of the general considerations set out in the Preamble. The specific considerations, which may assist in interpreting section 68, are considered below.
Tools in the Act itself
The Preamble prominently recognises the constitutional emphasis on the best interests of children and their need for special protection. 21 In the case of children "in 18 Before the constitutional era it was not common for legislation to include a preamble (see further conflict with the law" the emphasis is on their rights "not to be detained, except as a measure of last resort, and if detained, only for the shortest appropriate period of time", and not to be subjected to any harmful practices. The Preamble then spells out several aims of the Act, and the following two affect the interpretation of section 68: (1) whenever "appropriate circumstances" prevail, child offenders should be diverted from the criminal justice system; and (2) when diversion is not possible or advisable, the child offender should be dealt with "in the criminal justice system in child justice courts". When the child offender has to go through the trial process to the sentencing phase, the Act specifically sets out to provide "for a wide range of appropriate sentencing options specifically suited to the needs of children". The
Preamble also emphasises "the long-term benefits of a less rigid criminal justice process that suits the needs of children in conflict with the law in appropriate cases."
It also acknowledges that there are resource and other constraints in South African society, which might require an incremental implementation of the reformed juvenile justice system.
Amongst the various objects of the Act set out in section 2, the following two in particular may assist with the interpretation of section 68: (1) protecting the constitutional rights of children; 22 and (2) encouraging the use of diversion. 23 The guiding principles in section 3 "must be taken into account" when applying the provisions of the Act. Two of these guiding principles are particularly relevant to section 68: (1) the principle that a child should not be treated more severely than an adult would have been under similar circumstances; 24 and (2) that the "rights and obligations of children contained in international and regional instruments" also have to be taken into account.
25
A number of these considerations require closer scrutiny: the best interests of the child; the importance of diversion; that children should not be treated more severely than adults; and the relevant "international and regional instruments".
International and regional instruments
22 Section 2(a). 23 Section 2(d). 24 Section 3(b). 25 Section 3(i).
/ 638
The reference to "international and regional instruments" in the are 'more important than anything else'", this did not mean "that everything else is unimportant". As the "child's best interests" is not an unlimited right, 42 other rights also have to be taken into account and, when necessary, given effect to. 43 The result is that, despite the difference in wording, the child's best interests are of no greater importance under the Constitution than under the Convention. 44 Nevertheless, it is difficult to overstate the importance of what has been termed the heart of children's rights. 45 In S v M 46 the Court expressed itself as follows:
The ambit of the provisions [s 28(2) read with s 28(1)] 47 is undoubtedly wide. The comprehensive and emphatic language of s 28 indicates that just as law enforcement must always be gender-sensitive, so must it always be child-sensitive; that statutes must be interpreted and the common law developed in a manner which favours protecting and advancing the interests of children; and that courts must function in a manner which at all times shows due respect for children's rights.
The principle that the child's best interests are "more important than anything else" (in other words, that they are paramount) has, since Fletcher v Fletcher, 48 been considered part of our common law. 49 This is applied mostly in matters relating to family law, such as the custody of children in divorce proceedings, adoption, foster care and so on. 50 However, section 28(2) requires acknowledgement of the child's best interests "in every matter concerning the child", 51 which would certainly encompass criminal law and criminal justice as well. The extension of the best interests principle beyond its application to family law has been precipitated by international documents on the rights of children, and specifically by the Convention. 
There is no doubt that the Child Justice Act fully recognises the best-interests principle in the field of child criminal justice, as explicitly noted in the Preamble.
A child's best interests play a vital role in the interpretation of any statutory provision affecting child offenders. It is a consideration that must be given practical effect whenever a question is asked as to the purpose of a specific provision in the Act. As is normally the case, what is actually in the best interests of a child offender during the sentencing process can be established only through careful analysis of all of the facts relevant to the matter at hand. 52 Courts have wide discretionary powers to ensure that effect is given to the best interests of children. 53 They have to make sense of the "almost endless" number of factors 54 involved in every individual case in order to properly exercise the value judgment that any decision about the best interests inevitably requires.
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In closing it should be noted that most of the other rights in section 28 give effect to the best-interests principle (eg, the rights to parental or appropriate alternative care, to basic nutrition and other services, protection "from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation", 56 and so on). In addition, children are obviously also entitled to the other constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights. 57 Specifically related to sentencing, these rights include the rights to life, to dignity, a fair trial, and not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner, to state the most obvious examples. It is one of the central themes of the Act that children in conflict with the law should be diverted from the formal criminal justice system whenever possible. 59 Generally, diversion means that an accused person is not put through formal criminal proceedings but is subjected to an alternative process that does not involve a formal trial, conviction and a criminal record. 60 No sentence is imposed, although the alternative process may require the person to perform services or tasks, or to submit to training or other regimes, some of which might be of a punitive nature.
Diversion is widely considered to provide people in conflict with the law with a better opportunity of being successfully reintegrated into society than dealing with their behaviour through the formal criminal justice system. 61 There is abundant evidence that the deeper child offenders get involved in the formal criminal justice system, the better the chances are that, as adults, they will end up living a life of crime. Another fundamental principle of sentencing is that deprivation of liberty, if used at all, should only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. Consequently, the international law regulating the sentencing of children is characterised by an emphasis on the constructive purpose of the disposition rather than its punitive side. Specifically, and in contrast to adults, international law places restrictions on the periods for which children can be deprived of their liberty.
Although the passage quoted refers to sentencing and more specifically to the deprivation of liberty, its essence permeates the provisions of the Convention with respect to juvenile justice: 66 children must be treated in ways reflecting their age; the successful reintegration of child offenders into society is the desirable outcome; 67 and the treatment must be proportionate to the child's circumstances and the offence. 68 Given these principles, which have to be taken into account as guiding principles as well, 69 it is difficult to see how even treatment equal to that of an adult offender could be justified -after all, none of these considerations apply to adult offenders.
3
The basic provision on sentencing: section 68
"A child justice court…"
It is striking that the Act does not explicitly establish child justice courts. 70 Instead, it defines a "child justice court" 71 as "any court provided for in the Criminal Procedure courts (see further cl 1 of the proposed Bill: a child justice court is defined as "the court described in section 71" and "court" as "a child justice court or any other court acting in terms of the provisions of this Act"; cl 71 would establish child justice courts at the level of district magistrates' courts, involving regional and High Courts, especially to hear more serious cases). See also ch 9 (paras 9.1-9.46). The more familiar practice in our law is to explicitly establish a court and to circumscribe its powers in legislation. Act [51 of 1977] , dealing with the bail application, plea, trial or sentencing of a child".
The reference to the Criminal Procedure Act in this definition is surprising, as that Act does not establish any courts, nor does it generally determine their jurisdiction. It does make provision for "magistrates' courts", "lower courts", "superior courts" and "supreme courts". 72 The sentencing of offenders is one of the functions of all these courts. It is a fairly safe assumption that the legislature intended to declare that all of the courts that are involved in the criminal procedure of the country (dealing with "bail application, plea, trial or sentencing") are "child justice courts" when they apply or are required to apply the provisions of the Act. In other words, district magistrates' courts, regional courts and high courts may all operate as child justice courts. Other commentators on the Act also assume this to be the position. Any child whose matter has been referred to the child justice court in terms of section 49(2), must appear before a court with the requisite jurisdiction to be dealt with in terms of this Chapter.
In order to better comprehend this provision, one must briefly note the basic elements of the new child justice system. The first process is referred to as the preliminary enquiry, an informal process which serves as a child suspect's first court "are dealt with in Child Justice Courts"); Gallinetti Getting to Know the Child Justice Act 13 (even a high court applying the provisions of the Act is a child justice court for these purposes) 51; Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti 2011 PELJ 84 (most cases will be tried in the lower courts). 74 "Child" should also be understood as intended by the Act. See, in this connection, 3.4 below. 75 " [This] chapter" refers to chapter 9, the chapter dealing with trials in the child justice court. 76 A preliminary enquiry is a requirement (s 5(3)), unless the child has been taken out of the child justice process already. See, in general, Gallinetti "Child Justice" 653-654; Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 28-60. See s 43(3)(c), confirming that the preliminary enquiry amounts to the "first appearance before a lower court".
principle, take place within 48 hours of the arrest. 77 The enquiry is conducted by a magistrate in the presence of the child, a parent (or other person to support the child), a prosecutor and a probation officer. 78 Its main aim is to ensure that the child's case does not get lost in the system. At some point in the process the probation officer must formally assess the child in order to inform the decision of the enquiry magistrate as to the best next step to take. One of the outcomes of such an enquiry is that the child may be ordered to appear before a child justice court for trial.
In fact, as is clearly implied by section 63(1)(a), a child can be referred to court for trial only following a preliminary enquiry.
Section 63(1)(a) requires that the child justice court must have "the requisite jurisdiction". This is the only reference in the Act to the jurisdiction of this court. A court may lack "the requisite jurisdiction" because of the crime of which the accused is charged. For example, a district magistrates' court does not have the jurisdiction to try an adult offender for rape, murder or high treason, and a regional court not for high treason. 79 Although there are no specific provisions in the Act confirming such limitations in the case of child justice courts, the limitations are confirmed by the following basic principles and objects of the Act: 80 to protect the rights of children in general, 81 to ensure that they are not treated more severely than adults, 82 and that their best interests are of paramount importance throughout.
The same considerations as those noted above indicate that it is also safe to assume that the various courts retain the punitive jurisdiction that they have for adult offenders, in so far as such jurisdiction is not expressly changed by the Act. In other words, a magistrate's court acting as a child justice court will normally be limited to imprisonment of three years per offence, or fines of up to R 60 000; a regional court will normally be limited to imprisonment of 15 years per offence, or fines of up to R 300 000; high courts are limited to 25 years' imprisonment, 83 but the maximum fine is 77 Gallinetti "Child Justice" 654 (it is possible for the enquiry to be postponed, for not more than another 96 hours, under certain conditions -ss 48(1) read with 48(2)). 78 Gallinetti "Child Justice" 654. As with all offenders, sentencing is possible only after the conviction of an offence.
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This characteristic establishes an important difference between the basic underlying philosophies of the Act and that of the Children's Act.
No offences are excluded from the operation of the Act, which "applies to all criminal offences". 92 These offences are categorised into three schedules to the Act, which are arranged roughly in terms of seriousness: the least serious offences are in Schedule 1 93 and the most serious in Schedule 3. 
"…a child…"

Introduction
Nowadays, when reference is made in legislation to "a child", it is not unfair to assume that it refers to a person under the age of 18 years. Certainly, such an assumption would be supported by the Constitution, in terms of which a "child" is someone under the age of 18.
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However, it is immediately evident why, whenever the phrase "a child" is used in the Act in general, and in section 68 in particular, it could not always refer to a person under the age of 18. The problem is this: offenders who committed their crimes as children might no longer be children by the time they appear in the child justice court for trial and sentence. This problem is particularly acute in South Africa, where criminal cases can take years to complete, and where there are many examples of child offenders who are sentenced long after they had committed their crimes. 96 The reasons for this apparent anomaly range from the delayed laying of charges to problems relating to the apprehension of the offender, and sometimes simply the 91 This is a requirement of the legality principle, in terms of which only criminal conduct can be punished. See Rabie, Strauss and Maré Punishment 6-7, 81-89; Snyman Criminal Law 48-49. 92 Gallinetti "Child Justice" 649. 93 Some of the most serious of these offences include theft involving property of an amount not exceeding R 2 500; fraud not exceeding an amount of more than R 1 500; unlawful possession of certain drugs; consensual "statutory rape"; common assault, etc. 94 Including crimes such as treason, murder, rape, aggravated robbery, and so on. inertia of the criminal justice system. Finally, some prosecutors and other officials might be tempted to delay proceedings until the offender's eighteenth birthday simply in order to prevent the protection of the Act from applying to the offender.
97
There are two sides to this coin. On the one hand, delays in the system should not remove any child from the protection provided by the Act for no fault of his or her own. On the other hand, someone much older than 18 at the time of sentencing might, for that reason alone, not be a suitable candidate for the sentences provided for in Chapter 10, or be in need of the protection offered by the Act.
It is the intention of the Convention that child offenders should be treated differently from their adult counterparts. 98 The age of "under 18" is the international standard reflected in the Convention 99 and all related documents, including the African Children's Charter. These instruments also informed the rights in section 28 of the Constitution in this respect. The important result is that all persons who were under 18 years when they committed their offences should, ideally, be given the "benefits and protections" of the Bill of Rights for as long as this is the cut off age. 100 The question is how this ideal can be achieved in the case of child offenders without burdening the courts with offenders who, despite being children at the time of the crime, are much older during sentencing. 101 The way in which the Act approaches this issue is considered next, and it is useful to separate offenders who are children (under 18) during sentencing from those who are no longer children at the time of sentencing. 
The child offender is 18 or older when sentenced
When the child offender has reached the age of 18, the problems referred to earlier may arise. The Act attempts to solve these problems by focusing on the age of the direct that the matter be dealt with in terms of section 5(2) to (4).
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It remains an absolute requirement that the alleged offence must have been committed while the offender was under the age of 18 years. Section 4(2) permits the prosecution to be instituted subsequently, as long as the accused is under the age of 21 and it is permissible in terms of the NDPP directives. Once such an accused has been convicted by a child justice court, sentencing will also have to take place in terms of the Act.
The NDPP directives contain a list of considerations that are set in the alternative It is striking that undue delay in the institution of the proceedings is not mentioned as a factor, although it could potentially be included within (e) above.
The directives indicate that section 4(2) is unlikely to find frequent application.
Although children frequently commit the kind of offences listed in Schedule 1, it is the 107 Also note the definition in s 1 of an "adult", which "means a person who is 18 years or older but does not include a person referred to in section 4(2)". 108 NDPP "Directives" para M.4. 109 For examples of these offences, see fn 102 above. 110 NDPP "Directives" para M.8 adds that a "...direction should generally not be given where the coaccused are adults, unless the person was used by them to commit the crime." 111 These circumstances, listed in NDPP "Directives" para J.2, include the following: the offender was particularly youthful when the offence was committed; the child experiences "particular hardship, vulnerability or handicap", such as being the head of a household; and diminished criminal responsibility.
clear intention of the Act that the vast majority of these offences should be diverted rather than committed for trial.
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When the offender is 21 years of age or older when criminal proceedings are initiated, 113 regardless of whether or not the crime was committed when this person was still a child, the Act cannot find application. Such a person can be charged, tried and sentenced only in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.
3.4
"…must … impose a sentence in accordance with this Chapter."
What the child justice court has to do
The last part of section 68 requires the child justice court to impose a sentence, and to do so "in accordance" with the chapter of which section 68 is part, namely chapter 10. The phrase "in accordance with" points towards procedure, as it means "in a manner conforming with". 114 Is there any significance to this choice of words?
Certainly, chapter 10 contains both procedural and substantive provisions. Section 69, which contains the basic principles of sentencing, is a substantive provision, as are those sections containing the different sentencing options. 115 Sections 70, 71
and 79 are purely procedural provisions, but many of the other provisions also contain procedural parts. 116 There is no indication that the legislature attempted to separate substantive from procedural aspects in chapter 10, and it will be difficult to sustain any significance to the words "in accordance with". It is submitted that it was the intention of the legislature simply to point a child justice court to the provisions of chapter 10 as a first port of call after the conviction of a child offender.
112 See further, in particular, s 52(2) of the Act, which unconditionally permits the diversion of Schedule1 offences. The sentences in chapter 10 are the following: community-based sentences, restorative justice sentences, a fine, correctional supervision, residence in a child and youth care centre, and imprisonment. Most of these sentences may also be imposed as suspended sentences.
The incorporation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act
Although sentencing must take place in terms of the provisions of the Act, it is immediately apparent that chapter 10 of the Act is not self-contained. It does not contain all of the powers necessary to enable the child justice court to give the offender a fair sentencing hearing. There are several provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 with no equivalent in the Child Justice Act, but which are essential in the interests of child offenders, the victims of the crimes and/or the administration of justice. Such provisions include, for example, the authority to permit evidence necessary for the court to be properly informed about an appropriate sentence, 117 the right of the defence to produce evidence on sentencing and to address the court on a proper sentence, 118 the power of one presiding officer to impose sentence when the officer who convicted the offender is not available, 119 the power to order sentences to be served concurrently, 120 and the power to correct an incorrectly passed sentence.
121
It is exactly for this reason that parts of the Criminal Procedure Act are expressly incorporated into the Act. Two provisions contain a general incorporation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, namely sections 4(3)(a) and 63(1)(b). It needs to be established if these provisions also affect the sentencing phase, and to this end they need to be considered separately. 
Section 4(3)(a)
Section 4(3)(a) reads as follows:
The Criminal Procedure Act applies with the necessary changes as may be required by the context to any person referred to in this section, except in so far as this Act provides for amended, additional or different provisions or procedures in respect of that person.
This provision is intended as a "catch-all" provision for the application of the Act. 
Section 63(1)(b)
In terms of section 63(1)(b), the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act relating to plea and trial proceedings have to be followed by child justice courts. It reads as follows:
A child justice court must apply the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act relating to plea and trial of accused persons, as extended or amended by the provisions as set out in this Chapter [9] and Chapter 10.
The question is if this provision also involves the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings. The word "trial" is sometimes interpreted to include the sentencing phase as well. 124 For example, in S v Khuzwayo 125 the court rejected the trial magistrate's statement that diversion is possible only before conviction, clearly assuming that the "trial" 126 includes the sentencing phase. For the purposes of interpreting section 63, such an inclusion is supported by the fact that chapter 10, which deals with sentencing, is specifically mentioned. However, the issue is confused by the inclusion of the term "plea". Since the plea stage might also be considered part of "a trial", the fact that it is specifically used would indicate that the term "trial" as used here should be understood in accordance with its narrow meaning, being the process subsequent to the plea, until the court's conviction or acquittal. 127 In the end, it is difficult to find a clear indication of the legislature's intention with respect to the question of whether or not section 63(1)(b) should be extended to the sentencing phase.
Assessment
Neither section 4(3)(a) nor section 63 (1) 128 Although this conclusion is not very clear from the above approach, it is submitted that it is the closest to the original intention of the legislature, as indicated in the Preamble and other interpretive tools in the Act. In particular, these considerations include the best interests of the child, and the need for sentencing measures "specifically suited to the needs of children".
128 As provided for in s 296 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
Conclusion
It will not be possible to achieve the aims of the Child Justice Act through a too legalistic and literal interpretation of its provisions. Equally, it is impossible to consider its provisions on sentencing in isolation. The result is that, even when considering a provision as short and apparently to the point as section 68, there are no shortcuts to finding the legislature's true intentions.
Some of the potential pitfalls of section 68 include that the "child" offender who has to be sentenced need not be a "child", a person under 18 years old, which is what the term is lately generally taken to mean. And one of the biggest challenges is going to be to convince all role players that the sentences for child offenders are limited to those contained in the Act itself.
In essence there are two measures for the success of the new child justice system.
The first is how many children can be effectively diverted from the criminal justice system. The second measure is, when they cannot be diverted, how effective their sentences will be. A proper understanding of section 68 provides a corner stone for a foundation to effective sentencing in terms of the Child Justice Act. 
SUMMARY
The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 establishes a criminal justice system for child accused, separate from the criminal justice system which continues to apply for adult accused in South Africa. The Act aims to keep children out of detention and away from the formal criminal justice system, mainly through diversion. When these interventions would be inadequate or unsuccessful, the Act provides for child offenders to the tried and sentenced in child justice courts. Until now there has been little discussion of the details of the provisions dealing with sentencing.
Sentencing in a child justice court is regulated by chapter 10 of the Act and section 68 is the first section in this chapter. This section effectively amounts to the "jurisdictional" provision of the new child sentencing system: it not only mandates child justice courts to impose their sentences in terms of the Act, but also provides the first set of boundaries (or the first part of the framework) within which sentencing should take place.
Despite its brevity, section 68 is not without interpretative challenges. Of course, it has to be interpreted within the context of the entire Act. 
